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This comment responds to the recently held Global Research in International Political 
Economy roundtable on race in IPE. In particular, it argues that scholars of political 
economy could draw fruitfully on the notion of “whiteness as property” from the critical 
race theory subfield of law in order to trace the workings of whiteness, and race more 
broadly, as a material force in the economy. 
Discussions of race within political economy have tended 
to fall into two camps. First, there are scholars who consider 
race as a factor that shapes individuals’ economic percep-
tions. For example, American campaigners against free 
trade position white men in traditional manufacturing in-
dustries, rather than the working class more broadly, as in 
need of trade protection, and they focus on the jobs lost to 
China, rather than Canada, even though the United States 
trades roughly equally with both (Guisinger 2017). Second, 
there are those scholars who consider race as a nonmater-
ial interest, which individuals might weigh against, or over, 
economic needs. Such research often presents race as eco-
nomically irrational: a racist employer, for instance, forgo-
ing qualified Black applicants. 
Roundtable speakers pushed past this dichotomy, argu-
ing that scholars should treat race itself as a material in-
terest, such that those who are prioritize it are acting ra-
tionally in political economic terms. As Gina Yannitell 
Reinhardt (2021) notes in this special collection, there is 
growing recognition that “globalization, growth, and social 
and economic development have brought varying levels of 
wealth and hardship based on group characteristics such 
as race, gender, and class.” Yet the roundtable participants 
struggled to identify ways that political economists might 
practically apply such a view of race, because, as Kathleen 
McNamara argues in her roundtable comments, race is both 
mutable and relational, making it difficult to operationalize 
as a variable. 
A second strain of the discussion therefore focused on 
method, and on whether scholarship about race from cul-
tural studies and other humanities can be applied to polit-
ical economic research that is more materialist in focus. In 
this note, I would like to critique a common misperception 
in such debates that places critical race theory (CRT) under 
the cultural studies umbrella. With roots in law, a fellow so-
cial science, I argue that CRT has more in common with po-
This segment was recorded on September 30, 2020, 
as an installment of the Global Research in 
International Political Economy webinar series, 
organized by Layna Mosley (Princeton), Stephanie 
Rickard (London School of Economics) and B. Peter 
Rosendorff (New York University). 
litical economy, and is more materialist in orientation, than 
the disciplines to which we more commonly turn for insight 
on race. I do so by looking at the CRT concept of “whiteness 
as property,” outlining its overlap with our own understand-
ings of property, and how this insight might be applied in 
political economic research. 
CRT emerged in the 1980s as a body of scholarship inves-
tigating the persistence of racial inequity in the American 
justice system after the civil rights era. Its empirical focus 
has often been on the economy, including employment dis-
crimination (Crenshaw 1989), affirmative action admissions 
(Farber 1994), and quotas for public procurement (Chang 
1997). This scope is squarely materialist. Fundamental to 
this materialism is the concept of “whiteness as property,” 
mat.msc@cbs.dk a 
Atal, Maha Rafi. 2021. “Measuring the Wages of Whiteness: A Project for Political




 http://online.ucpress.edu/gp/article-pdf/2/1/22154/462703/globalperspectives_2021_2_1_22154.pdf by U
niversity of G
lasgow
 user on 27 Septem
ber 2021
first articulated by Cheryl Harris (1993). In this landmark 
essay, Harris demonstrates that property law in the United 
States is intimately bound up with race. This is because ef-
forts to secure white Americans’ property in African slaves 
made the formalization of property rights contingent on 
race. Only Black people could be slaves, and as such, courts 
treated Black people as synonymous with property, allow-
ing for debts to be paid, for example, in “money or negroes” 
(Harris 1993, 1720). 
This finding is intertwined with political economy. As 
Robbie Shilliam (2020) has shown, the discipline of political 
economy developed in dialogue with litigation about the 
status of slavery. Enlightenment theorists of commerce, 
such as Adam Smith, justified their support for free trade in 
terms of commercial liberty, the notion that free exchange 
between consenting participants would yield the “liberal re-
ward of labor” in which the fruits of labor are shared by the 
laborer himself. This necessarily excluded from legitimate 
commerce the use of slaves, who neither generated nor ben-
efited from such liberal rewards. At the same time, early 
theorists of property, in particular Locke, placed the labor of 
agricultural cultivation at the heart of legitimate first pos-
session, while arguing that such labor necessarily increased 
the goods available in common to society (Waldron 2020). 
In the nineteenth century, these debates converged, as abo-
litionists drew attention to the provision grounds farmed by 
slaves for their own subsistence as evidence that Black peo-
ple, if freed, could carry out the type of productive labor 
within patriarchal families that theories of commerce and 
property required. 
Yet this free commercial society required the disposses-
sion of Native Americans, and the same theories of property 
held that the forms of land use and family structures prac-
ticed by tribes did not constitute the type of first occupancy 
that would make them rightful owners (Harris 1993, 
1721-22). In this way, the law made property ownership 
contingent on proximity to whiteness. Indeed, in the years 
leading up to the American Civil War, references to “prop-
erty rights” were often taken axiomatically to refer to the 
“protection of slaveowners’ supposed property in other hu-
man beings” (Levy 2017). 
Moreover, Harris argues, the legal regime this historical 
process created turned whiteness itself into a type of prop-
erty, with five central dimensions. First, whiteness is some-
thing individuals and groups can acquire. Nineteenth-cen-
tury immigrants to the United States from southern and 
eastern Europe were initially treated as nonwhite, with 
whiteness restricted to those of northern or western Eu-
ropean descent. Over the course of the twentieth century, 
these immigrant groups were assimilated into whiteness, 
acquiring the privileges in society that accompanied this 
status (Roediger 2006). 
Second, whiteness is something those who hold it can 
pass on. Classical theories identified alienability as a central 
feature of property: for this reason, J. S. Mill (1909) argued 
that monopoly privileges and public offices, granted by the 
Crown to particular corporations or individuals, could not 
constitute property. This view would seem to exclude per-
sonal characteristics, such as race. However, Lockean the-
ories of property hold that man’s first right of property is 
property over himself. Moreover, as Engels argued, prop-
erty’s relationship to the patriarchal family made inheri-
tance a fundamental component of property rights (Engels 
2010). Whiteness is therefore property in the sense that it, 
like other assets, can be passed from parent to child, and 
its heritability is what makes it difficult for outsiders to ac-
quire. The ability to pass whiteness on to one’s children re-
flects the theoretical construction of property as what Ben-
tham called “the basis of expectation,” an object bound up 
in the ability to plan for one’s own future, and thus in the 
property in oneself (Harris 1993, 1729). 
Third, whiteness gives its owners the right to use it to 
benefit themselves or to acquire other valuable things. 
White people are able to leverage their whiteness to gain 
preferential access to jobs, promotions, and mortgages or 
preferential treatment from police, teachers, or other au-
thority figures. This is what W. E. B. Du Bois (1998) fa-
mously called a “public and psychological wage” of white-
ness. For Du Bois, these wages included the ability to have 
these privileges enforced by the state, just as the state pro-
tects, through the enforcement of contracts, the use rights 
of property owners more broadly. Economists from Her-
nando de Soto (2000) to Geoffrey Hodgson (2014) have ar-
gued that the value of formal property rights is their role 
in enabling the systems of credit necessary for accumulat-
ing other capital. In political economic terms, then, “white 
privilege” is a kind of credit relationship in which whiteness 
functions as collateral for the acquisition of other assets. 
Fourth, whiteness affects the status of the person who 
holds it. In Harris’s essay, this status value is demonstrated 
by the phenomenon of “passing,” a practice that exists only 
because gaining access to whiteness means gaining access 
to higher social status. Harris draws attention to Plessy v. 
Ferguson, the lawsuit that established the legality of segre-
gation in the United States, noting that Plessy, whose exclu-
sion from a whites-only rail carriage triggered the dispute, 
was of mostly white descent and often passed for white in 
daily life. The case turned on whether he was being un-
lawfully denied the status value of whiteness to which he 
had been accustomed, and not on an unequivocal claim of 
equality (Harris 1993, 1747). In classical political economy, 
this status dimension of property is reflected in theories 
of defamation, which treat a person’s reputation as an in-
tegral part of their Lockean property in themselves, which 
can be given monetary value, such that individuals can re-
ceive damages for libelous attacks. As Harris notes, accusing 
a white person of being Black has historically been upheld 
as a form of defamation, recognizing whiteness as status 
property (Harris 1993, 1735). Indeed, a 1992 survey showed 
white people demanding as much as $50 million as com-
pensation for the hypothetical penalty of being made Black 
(Hacker 1992, 32). 
Fifth, whiteness is exclusive to its owners and derives 
power chiefly from the existence of nonwhite “others.” This 
makes the right to exclude, for Harris (1993, 1721), the 
“conceptual nucleus” of whiteness as property, around 
which its other features cohere. For much of the history 
of the United States, as well as other racially segregated 
societies such as apartheid South Africa, the state has in-
vested in formally establishing through parentage who has 
a “legitimate” claim to whiteness, as a way of protecting 
its exclusivity. The property value of an exclusive whiteness 
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has often been taken by its owners as just compensation 
for the lack of other economic assets: the shared property 
stake in whiteness has prevented white workers from chal-
lenging the power of white managers or building solidarity 
with workers who are not white (Loomis 2018). This behav-
ior is not irrational. The economic position of white work-
ers has been materially enhanced by the ability to exclude: 
throughout the twentieth century, labor unions across Eu-
rope, North America, and southern Africa maintained strict 
color bars (Rosenow 2015; Money 2018). This policy pro-
tected the wages of their white members by maintaining 
an artificially tight labor market in which Black and brown 
workers, excluded from these unions, did not compete for 
the same jobs as white workers and instead performed the 
more dangerous and poorly paid roles that whites would not 
(Loomis 2014; Reich 2009). 
Moreover, much as the formalization of property is pro-
ductive of further capitalist development, so, in the United 
States in particular, was the formalization of whiteness pro-
ductive of political development. The forging of a repub-
lican identity, the creation of American citizens with an 
identity distinct from the various European countries from 
which they or their ancestors had migrated, depended on 
the stake in whiteness these groups shared and the line 
of exclusion drawn between them and those who were not 
white (Fox and Bloemraad 2015). The Naturalization Act of 
1790 explicitly required whiteness as a criterion of citizen-
ship, while the expansion of citizenship for white immi-
grants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was inter-
twined with the deepening exclusion of African Americans 
under Jim Crow (Harris 1993, 1745). Much as countries have 
historically established property requirements for the 
granting of the franchise, the United States required its new 
citizens to meet a threshold of whiteness. 
The abolition of legal discrimination did not abolish the 
property that inhered in whiteness. When slavery was abol-
ished, most countries, including Britain and France, paid 
compensation to slave owners (Shilliam 2020; Grosset and 
Guidetti 2013; Draper 2013). In effect, this action converted 
the form of the property they held from humans to cash, 
rather than abolishing it. As a fungible asset, that cash re-
mains in the economy and continues to impact the dis-
tribution of wealth today. The passage of civil rights and 
equal protection laws in the century that followed did not 
abolish the privileges of use, status, and excludability that 
whites had already acquired. Instead, the laws established 
the value of those privileges as a baseline, making policies 
that deliberately redistribute the assets of whiteness—for 
example, through affirmative action—open to legal chal-
lenges as expropriation (Onstad 2007). Even where courts 
have upheld such programs, they have accepted that they 
materially burden whites on the basis that they impinge on 
whites’ “settled expectations” of how they will be treated, 
their property in their own futures (Harris 1993, 1721). 
This history makes the persistence of white racism much 
more legible. Classical political economists, beginning with 
Adam Smith (1853), argued that our values or moral senti-
ments are always shaped by our material interests in how 
we are seen. White racism, in protecting the privileges of 
use, status, and excludability that attach to being seen as 
white, is protecting a material interest. Conceptualizing 
whiteness in this way can allow political economists to iso-
late race as a material factor at work in our field of study. 
The fungibility and relationality of property as already the-
orized in our canon make sense of the mutability and rela-
tionality of race. 
Political economists also have the opportunity to expand 
the scope of CRT. CRT scholars have previously relied on 
legal-historical methods that overlap closely with the ap-
proaches of political economists studying international law, 
as Rachel Wellhausen (2021) demonstrates in her contribu-
tion to this collection. The insight of “whiteness as prop-
erty,” however, can also be applied in quantitative and ex-
perimental research, something legal scholars of CRT have 
not pursued. While roundtable participants expressed con-
cern about how race could be incorporated into political 
economic research, or whether particular methods are re-
quired, CRT is a framework that allows for methodological 
pluralism. In pursuing that pluralism, political economists 
would also be enriching CRT. Moreover, while CRT devel-
oped in the American context, where only whiteness has 
property value in law, international and comparative polit-
ical economists might seek to measure race as property in 
country and regional contexts where other identities have 
hegemonic and excludable status. This is another dimen-
sion in which political economic engagement with CRT 
might contribute to the theory’s development. 
Consider, for example, the case presented at the outset: 
that surveys about attitudes to trade disproportionately fo-
cus on white men in traditional industries “losing” jobs to 
China. Instead of regarding this focus as symbolic, political 
economists might empirically establish whether the tradi-
tional industries are those that maintained formal or infor-
mal color bars in the twentieth century, and how those color 
bars affected the historical distribution of jobs and wages. 
Are the white men who perceive a loss to trade those whose 
fathers and grandfathers had “good” jobs and high wages 
in large part because of a color bar? We might equally in-
vestigate whether the comparatively low salience of trade 
policy to Black voters reflects the fact that the outsourcing 
of these traditional jobs is of limited economic relevance to 
those whose families were excluded from holding the jobs 
to begin with. In such a context, both Black and white work-
ers are responding to trade in rational terms. Political eco-
nomic research might seek to materially define the value of 
whiteness as property in exposure to such trade-related job 
loss: what level of color bar or race-based historical wage 
gap produces what levels of discrepancies in response to 
trade? While driven conceptually by the insights of CRT, 
such a question lends itself empirically to methods that 
political economists already use, as it requires analysis of 
labor market data on income and demographics. In other 
words, once whiteness is understood as a fungible asset that 
white people trade, leverage, or collateralize in exchange for 
other goods in the economy, it becomes much easier to ma-
terially trace how much it is worth, and what it costs. 
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